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Abstract
The ideal Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol is based
on the preparation and measurement of qubits in two alternative bases differing by an
angle of pi/2. Any real implementation of the protocol, though, will inevitably introduce
misalignments in the preparation of the states and in the alignment of the measurement
bases with respect to this ideal situation. Various security proofs take into account (at
least partially) such errors, i.e., show how Alice and Bob can still distil a secure key in the
presence of these imperfections. Here, we consider the complementary problem: how can
Eve exploit misalignments to obtain more information about the key than would be possible
in an ideal implementation? Specifically, we investigate the effects of misalignment errors
on the security of the BB84 protocol in the case of individual attacks, where necessary and
sufficient conditions for security are known. Though the effects of these errors are small
for expected deviations from the perfect situation, our results nevertheless show that Alice
and Bob can incorrectly conclude that they have established a secure key if the inevitable
experimental errors in the state preparation and in the alignment of the measurements
are not taken into account. This gives further weight to the idea that the formulation
and security analysis of any quantum cryptography protocol should be based on realistic
assumptions about the properties of the apparatus used. Additionally, we note that BB84
seems more robust against alignment imperfections if both the x and z bases are used to
generate the key.
1 Introduction
The use of quantum systems to accomplish cryptographic tasks promises levels of security un-
achievable with any classical system. With these benefits, however, comes an added difficulty.
Unlike classical protocols intended for execution on a digital computing device and whose secu-
rity is purely based on the mathematical properties of the device’s outputs, quantum protocols
make use of analogue systems and their security is intrinsically physical : it depends on the
∗Erik.Woodhead@ulb.ac.be
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fact that device’s output was obtained by measuring, e.g., the polarisation of a single photon
along well defined orientations. Deviations from the ideal situation, which are an all-or-nothing
affair in a digital algorithm and can typically be eliminated with some very large probability,
therefore become inevitable to some degree in quantum protocols.
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1] for quantum key distribution [2, 3], for instance,
requires that one party (‘Alice’) prepares and sends a sequence of random qubits taken from
the set {|ψbm〉}, where the indices b,m ∈ {0, 1} can be interpreted as a choice of basis and bit,
respectively. The other party (‘Bob’) then randomly measures each qubit he receives in one
of two bases {|φ00〉, |φ01〉} or {|φ10〉, |φ11〉}. In its ideal formulation, the states {|ψb0〉, |ψb1〉}
prepared by Alice are supposed to form a basis and therefore to be orthogonal,
〈ψb0|ψb1〉 = 0 for b = 0, 1 . (1)
Furthermore, the two bases on Alice’s and on Bob’s sides are supposed to differ exactly by an
angle of pi/2, i.e., to satisfy the relations1
|ψ10〉 = 1√2
[|ψ00〉+ |ψ01〉] , (2a)
|ψ11〉 = 1√2
[|ψ01〉 − |ψ00〉] , (2b)
and
|φ10〉 = 1√2
[|φ00〉+ |φ01〉] , (3a)
|φ11〉 = 1√2
[|φ01〉 − |φ00〉] . (3b)
While existing security proofs for BB84 can deal with an arbitrary noise in the quantum chan-
nel from Alice to Bob, they usually assume that the states prepared by Alice and that the
measurements performed by Bob satisfy precisely the conditions (1), (2), and (3). In a realistic
execution of the protocol, however, experimental errors are inevitable. For instance, the mea-
surement of a polarisation qubit cannot be more precise than 2◦ or 4◦ (on the Bloch sphere)
due to the intrinsic uncertainty of the polarisation rotator used. Such imperfections may allow
an eavesdropper to gain more information about the shared key than existing security proofs
would imply.
Here we illustrate the effects that imperfections in the preparation of the states and in the
alignment of the measurement bases could have on the performance of quantum cryptography
protocols, using the BB84 protocol as our example.
We note that proofs of security of BB84 have been proposed that relax conditions (1) and (2)
[4, 5], conditions (3) [6], conditions (2) and (3) [7], and also that take into account certain
particular modifications of all three conditions (1), (2), and (3) in the context of collective
attacks [8]. A proof of security in the asymptotic limit valid against arbitrary deviations from
the three conditions (1), (2), and (3) has also been reported in [9]. These types of analyses,
however, are not routinely considered and scarcely used in practical implementations of BB84
[10]. The main objective of this paper is to draw attention to this issue.
1In addition, in the ideal formulation of the BB84 protocol, the bases on Alice’s and Bob’s sides are usually
taken to be perfectly aligned, i.e., |ψbm〉 = |φbm〉. But any misalignment between the two bases can always
be absorbed in the unitary transformation performed by Eve on the states emitted by Alice and thus has no
incidence on the security of the protocol.
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Rather than deriving a new security proof, our aim is to demonstrate an explicit advantage
gained by an eavesdropper. We therefore restrict our analysis to individual attacks – where
contrarily to more general types of attacks, necessary and sufficient conditions for security are
known – and optimise over all possible attacks of this type in the presence of imperfections.
We emphasise that though security proofs against more general types of attacks, such as those
mentioned above, do report keyrates that are lower than in the ideal case, it is not a priori
clear that these observed reductions in security are genuine and not an artefact of a suboptimal
security proof. In the case of individual attacks, however, optimal criteria for security are known,
and thus any reduction in the keyrate that we observe illustrates some genuine advantage gained
by the eavesdropper. Furthermore, general security proofs bound security “from below”, ruling
out possible successful attacks by an eavesdropper below a certain threshold. In optimising
explicitly over individual attacks, we bound security “from above”. Our results can thus also
be viewed as representing an upper bound on security: we strictly prove that non-ideal BB84
implementations of the type we consider are insecure above a certain threshold.
For simplicity, we consider the case where the states emitted by Alice still form two orthonormal
bases as in (1). (Any deviation from (1) can only reinforce the effects of imperfections that we
illustrate here.) We suppose, however, that Alice’s preparation and Bob’s measurement bases
are not exactly mutually unbiased, but that they differ by angles α and β, respectively, different
from pi/2. That is, we suppose instead of (2) and (3) that
|ψ10〉 = cos
(
α
2
)|ψ00〉+ sin(α2 )|ψ01〉 , (4a)
|ψ11〉 = cos
(
α
2
)|ψ01〉 − sin(α2 )|ψ00〉 , (4b)
and
|φ10〉 = cos
(β
2
)|φ00〉+ sin(β2 )|φ01〉 , (5a)
|φ11〉 = cos
(β
2
)|φ01〉 − sin(β2 )|φ00〉 . (5b)
It is clear that such errors will in general reduce the security of BB84. For example, in the
extreme case where the two bases accidentally coincide (α, β = 0), an eavesdropper could
perfectly clone the states sent by Alice without revealing her presence. Using a combination
of analytical techniques and numerical optimisation, we demonstrate here more generally a
reduction in the extractable secret keyrate of the BB84 protocol against individual attacks, for
a given quantum bit error rate (QBER), when α, β 6= pi/2.
Though the reduction in the keyrate that we observe is small for deviations from the ideal sit-
uation expected in realistic implementations, our results nevertheless show that Alice and Bob
can erroneously conclude that they have established a secure key if the inevitable experimen-
tal errors in the alignment of the bases are not taken into account. Though our findings are
restricted to individual attacks, it is reasonable to expect that similar results hold in full gen-
erality. This gives further weight to the idea that the formulation and security analysis of any
quantum cryptography protocol should be based on realistic assumptions about the properties
of the apparatus used.
This conclusion goes in a similar direction as that which can be drawn from the recent weaknesses
discovered in certain QKD implementations, such as [11, 12]. Note though that our work
has a very different perspective. Indeed, contrary to [11, 12], our results do not uncover an
implementation flaw in an otherwise theoretically secure scheme – a flaw which could therefore
be fixed purely at the implementation level. The message that we want to convey here is rather
3
that in any trusted and “secure” QKD implementation, uncertainties in the preparation of the
quantum states and in the alignment of the measurement bases will inevitably be present and
may affect the security. These uncertainties must therefore be accounted for at a theoretical
level either by adapting the security proof or by moving to device-independent [13, 14] or semi-
device-independent schemes [15–17].
The present work originates from a loose collaboration with the authors of [18, 19], who along
similar lines have explored the effect of imperfections in the alignment of measurement bases on
the characterisation of quantum resources through quantum state tomography and entanglement
witnesses.
Our results are presented in more detail in section 2; technical details are deferred to section 3.
2 Results
2.1 Problem definition
We begin by briefly recounting the BB84 protocol. As recalled above, one party (Alice) prepares
random qubits from the set {|ψbm〉}, and transmits them to a second party (Bob). Bob then
measures each qubit that he receives in one of two bases {|φb0〉, |φb1〉}, randomly choosing
between b = 0 and b = 1 each time, and stores the results. After discarding the cases where the
choices of basis do not match, Alice and Bob share a so-called “sifted key”, with Bob’s version
of the key likely containing errors compared with Alice’s. By sacrificing a part of the sifted
key, Alice and Bob can estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q, which is defined in
terms of the observed coincidence rates p(b)(m,n) of Alice sending a state encoding bit m and
Bob measuring n, given basis b. Assuming that the QBER is the same in both bases, it can be
defined as
Q = 12
∑
b∈{0,1}
(
p(b)(0, 1) + p(b)(1, 0)
)
. (6)
Following this, error correction and privacy amplification are applied. In the case of one-way
communication from Alice to Bob, the asymptotic keyrate secure against individual attacks is
given by the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner bound [20]:
r = I(A : B)− I(A : E) , (7)
where I(A : B) denotes the mutual information between Alice and Bob and I(A : E) between
Alice and Eve. We recall that, in the case of individual attacks, Eve performs the same unitary
attack on each of Alice’s qubits, but is allowed to possess a quantum memory and can delay
her measurements on the states in her possession until after the bases are revealed. Fuchs et al.
show in [21] that the highest secure asymptotic keyrate under conditions (1), (2), (3) is given
in terms of Q by
r = h
(
1
2 −
√
Q(1−Q))− h(Q) , (8)
where h is the binary entropy function.
Our task is to minimise the expression (7) for a given QBER Q using the preparation and
measurement bases defined by (4) and (5) rather than the ideal ones. To simplify the analysis
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we will assume that the errors observed between Alice and Bob are symmetric, i.e.
p(0)(0, 1) = p(0)(1, 0) = p(1)(0, 1) = p(1)(1, 0) . (9)
Given our assumptions about the symmetries in the errors observed by Alice and Bob, I(A : B)
is a simple function of Q:
I(A : B) = 2− h(Q) . (10)
In general there need not be such symmetries in the joint probabilities p
(b)
AE(m, q) shared between
Alice and Eve, and I(A : E) is accordingly more complicated. In each basis it will be convenient
to parameterise these quantities in terms of an error Q
(b)
AE analogous to the QBER, and an offset
δ(b):
p
(b)
AE(0, 0) =
1
2(1−Q
(b)
AE − δ(b)) , (11a)
p
(b)
AE(0, 1) =
1
2(Q
(b)
AE + δ
(b)) , (11b)
p
(b)
AE(1, 0) =
1
2(Q
(b)
AE − δ(b)) , (11c)
p
(b)
AE(1, 1) =
1
2(1−Q
(b)
AE + δ
(b)) . (11d)
The inverse relations are Q
(b)
AE = p
(b)
AE(0, 1) + p
(b)
AE(1, 0) and δ
(b) = p
(b)
AE(0, 1) − p(b)AE(1, 0). The
mutual information between Alice and Eve is given by
I(A : E) = 1 + 12
(
I(0)(A : E) + I(1)(A : E)
)
, (12)
where I(b)(A : E) is the mutual information in a single basis, determined by the joint probabil-
ities p
(b)
AE(m,n).
We present results for the numerical optimisation of this problem in the next subsection. Details
of the parameterisation and techniques employed are deferred to section 3.
2.2 Optimisation results
In numerically evaluating the keyrate, it generally seems to be the case, as one might expect,
that the minimal keyrate is found for a unitary interaction that gives Eve symmetric information
about the bits in Alice’s possession. In terms of the parameterisation introduced at the end of
the previous section, this is the case where δ(0) = δ(1) = 0 and Q
(0)
AE = Q
(1)
AE ≡ QAE. The keyrate
is then a simple function of Q and QAE:
r = h(QAE)− h(Q) . (13)
Supported by a few test cases, this simplification was applied in the results we now present.
(Note that even if Eve’s optimal attack does not generally satisfy this symmetry, our results
still represent an upper bound on the secure keyrate, which conclusively shows that Eve can
gain information by exploiting preparation and measurement imperfections with respect to the
ideal case.)
Figure 1 is a plot of the optimised keyrate as a function of Q for a few fixed values of α = β = θ.
The values of θ used are 90◦ (the ideal case), 80◦, and 70◦. The latter two are the worst-case
5
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Figure 1: Variation of keyrate with QBER for θ = 90◦, 80◦, and 70◦, corresponding to the
worst-case scenarios for errors of 0◦, 5◦, and 10◦ respectively.
scenarios if there are absolute experimental errors of respectively 5◦ and 10◦ on the orientations
of the bases both used by Alice and measured by Bob. That is, if Alice and Bob know, say, that
their devices are accurate to within five degrees, i.e., 80◦ ≤ α, β ≤ 90◦, then the worst keyrate
that we have found corresponds to the situation α = β = θ = 80◦. The worst-case scenario is
thus that the largest possible error on the orientation of the devices is systematic.
δθ
r
0−50◦ 50◦
0.7
Figure 2: Variation of keyrate with angle δθ = 90
◦ − θ, for Q = 14Q0, 12Q0, and 34Q0, where
Q0 ≈ 0.1464 is the upper secure bound on the QBER.
Figure 2 is a plot of the minimised keyrate as a function of the deviation δθ = pi/2− θ from the
ideal case, for QBERs of 14Q0,
1
2Q0, and
3
4Q0, where Q0 =
1
2 − 14
√
2 ≈ 0.1464 is the maximum
tolerable QBER in the ideal case.
Finally, figure 3 is a plot of the upper secure bound on the QBER as a function of the deviation
δθ = pi/2 − θ. The Shor-Preskill bound of 0.11 [22], representing the best known threshold
QBER below which an ideal BB84 implementation is known to be secure against arbitrary
attacks, is added for comparison.
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Figure 3: Maximum secure QBER as a function of δθ = 90
◦ − θ. The horizontal dashed line
(S-P) corresponds to the Shor-Preskill bound of about 0.11.
2.3 Discussion
Assuming that Alice and Bob observe errors that are symmetric, according to (9), using a
combination of analytical and numerical techniques we have determined upper bounds on the
keyrate for preparation and measurement devices characterised by the misalignment angles α
and β defined in (4) and (5). As soon as α, β 6= pi/2, we find that these upper bounds are lower
than the optimal keyrate (8) for a given QBER, therefore showing that imperfections in the
preparation and measurement devices can be exploited by an eavesdropper if they are not taken
into account in the security proof. We also draw attention to the fact that the threshold QBER
illustrated in figure 3 drops below the Shor-Preskill bound of about 0.11 for deviation angles
larger than about 20.7◦, demonstrating that the Shor-Preskill keyrate is certainly insecure in
this case.
The upper bounds that we have obtained correspond to the best individual attack that is sym-
metric, i.e., that satisfies δ(0) = δ(1) = 0 and Q
(0)
AE = Q
(1)
AE ≡ QAE. We have numerically verified
in a few test cases that the best overall individual attack satisfies this symmetry condition. We
thus expect our upper bounds on the keyrate to actually correspond to the optimal keyrates in
the presence of imperfections of the type we consider.
If Alice and Bob know that their devices are accurate to within a given precision δθ, they should
assume, for the purpose of proving security, that their devices are characterised by the angles α
and β compatible with this precision that yield the worst-case keyrate. We verified in a few test
cases that this happens for the smallest angles α and β consistent with the set error, at least in
the case where the set error is the same on Alice’s and Bob’s devices. It is for this reason that
the above figures are plotted for values of the angles satisfying α = β = θ = pi/2− δθ.
All the results that we have presented here were obtained for the case where both bases are used
to establish the secret key. One may also consider the variant of BB84 in which only one basis
is used to generate the key [23]. In the ideal case, this results in a keyrate that is asymptotically
twice as high, as the sifting step, where half of the results are discarded, is no longer necessary.
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We have also adapted our analysis to this situation and have found that for high QBERs the
two-basis protocol results in a higher keyrate than the single-basis one, suggesting that the
former is more robust against alignment errors.
Finally, we remind the reader that throughout our analysis, we have assumed that the states
prepared by Alice define a basis, i.e., satisfy (1). Relaxing this condition could only strengthen
the effects of imperfections observed here.
3 Technical details
3.1 Eve’s interaction
The model applied here is a straightforward adaptation of the one considered in [21]. In the
worst-case scenario the eavesdropper (Eve) has replaced the quantum channel between Alice
and Bob with a lossless channel, before appending an ancilla to the state sent by Alice and
applying a unitary operation with the intent of cloning the communication. We express the
interaction as
|ψ00〉|0〉 7→ |Ψ00〉 , (14a)
|ψ01〉|0〉 7→ |Ψ01〉 , (14b)
in the basis b = 0, and similarly
|ψ10〉|0〉 7→ |Ψ10〉 , (15a)
|ψ11〉|0〉 7→ |Ψ11〉 , (15b)
in the basis b = 1, where the states {|Ψbx〉} are states in the Hilbert space HB ⊗HE accessible
to Bob and Eve. Linearity of the unitary interaction implies that these states obey the same
relations as {|ψbx〉}. Specifically,
|Ψ10〉 = cos
(
α
2
)|Ψ00〉+ sin(α2 )|Ψ01〉 , (16a)
|Ψ11〉 = cos
(
α
2
)|Ψ01〉 − sin(α2 )|Ψ00〉 . (16b)
In order to parameterise the interaction, we set
|Ψ00〉 = |φ00〉
(|a〉+ |b〉)+ |φ01〉(|c〉+ |d〉) , (17a)
|Ψ01〉 = |φ01〉
(|a〉 − |b〉)+ |φ00〉(|c〉 − |d〉) , (17b)
and
|Ψ10〉 = |φ10〉
(|a′〉+ |b′〉)+ |φ11〉(|c′〉+ |d′〉) , (18a)
|Ψ11〉 = |φ11〉
(|a′〉 − |b′〉)+ |φ10〉(|c′〉 − |d′〉) , (18b)
where |a〉, |b〉, |c〉, |d〉 ∈ HE are (not necessarily normalised) states accessible to Eve whose
“metric” γij = 〈i|j〉, i, j ∈ {a, b, c, d} completely defines Eve’s interaction. Combining (17) and
(18) with (16) and (5), we extract the relations
|a′〉 = cos(∆)|a〉+ sin(∆)|d〉 , (19a)
|d′〉 = cos(∆)|d〉 − sin(∆)|a〉 , (19b)
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and
|b′〉 = cos(θ)|b〉+ sin(θ)|c〉 , (20a)
|c′〉 = cos(θ)|c〉 − sin(θ)|b〉 , (20b)
where we have set
∆ =
β − α
2
, (21a)
θ =
β + α
2
. (21b)
The problem now is to identify the metric γij which will maximise the information Eve is able
to gain about Alice’s raw key. Note that this information also depends on the measurements
Eve performs on her part of the states she shares with Bob. In general these will be positive
operator-valued measures (POVMs) which are allowed to depend on the basis (since we allow
Eve to possess a quantum memory). We call the POVM elements Fb0 and Fb1, where b ∈ {0, 1}
and Fb0 +Fb1 = 1. As will be explained in the next subsection, we will be able to eliminate the
explicit appearance of the POVM elements in our optimisation problem.
3.2 Eve’s quantum error
As stated in the introduction to this section, we wish to minimise the extractable secret keyrate,
which involves maximising the mutual information I(A : E). As a stepping stone to optimising
this quantity we will consider the QBER in Eve’s inference of Alice’s bits, QAE, first introduced
in section 1, in (11). Working in a single basis b for now, this quantity is given by
Q
(b)
AE = p
(b)
AE(0, 1) + p
(b)
AE(1, 0) . (22)
In general I(b)(A : E) depends on both this error Q
(b)
AE and the asymmetry δ
(b) also introduced in
(11), and is an increasing function as Q
(b)
AE approaches 1/2 for fixed δ
(b). Rather than attempting
to directly optimise the mutual information in terms of Q
(b)
AE and δ
(b), we instead turn our
attention to the combination
Q
(b)
AE(ε) = (1 + ε)p
(b)
AE(0, 1) + (1− ε)p(b)AE(1, 0) . (23)
In terms of Q
(b)
AE and δ
(b) this is
Q
(b)
AE(ε) = Q
(b)
AE + εδ
(b) . (24)
Optimising this quantity yields a δ(b), dependent on the weighting parameter ε, and an optimal
Q
(b)
AE given δ
(b). By varying ε one may hope to sweep the range of values of δ(b) and obtain
a profile of minimised Q
(b)
AE as a function of δ
(b). The motivation for this approach becomes
apparent when we express Q
(b)
AE(ε) in terms of Eve’s probe and POVM elements.
In terms of Eve’s interaction and measurement,
p
(b)
AE(0, 1) =
1
2 Tr[ρb0Fb1] , (25a)
p
(b)
AE(1, 0) =
1
2 Tr[ρb1Fb0] , (25b)
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where ρbx = TrB[|Ψbx〉〈Ψbx|], TrB is the partial trace over HB, and Fbz are POVM elements
which sum to unity for each basis. Substituting into (23) and using that Fb1 = 1 − Fb0, we
obtain
Q
(b)
AE(ε) =
1
2(1 + ε)− 12 Tr
[(
(ρb0 − ρb1) + ε(ρb0 + ρb1)
)
Fb0
]
. (26)
This expression is minimised by taking for Fb0 a projector which selects the positive eigenvalue
part of the operator in the trace (the Helstro¨m bound). The result of optimising over Eve’s
measurement is
Q
(b)
AE(ε) =
1
2 − 14
∥∥(ρb0 − ρb1) + ε(ρb0 + ρb1)∥∥1 , (27)
where for an arbitrary matrix ‖M‖1 = Tr[(M †M)1/2]. This replaces the explicit appearance of
Eve’s POVM with an eigenvalue problem, leaving only an optimisation over Eve’s interaction.
Note that this would not be possible if we instead attempted to optimise Q
(b)
AE for fixed δ
(b),
since in that case the POVM element Fb0 would appear explicitly in the constraint as well as
in the expression to optimise.
Using b = 0 as an example, we now describe how we approach the problem of maximising Q
(0)
AE
and how we extract the corresponding values of Q
(0)
AE and δ
(0). In terms of the four states |a〉,
|b〉, |c〉 and |d〉 introduced earlier in order to parameterise the probe,
1
2(ρ00 − ρ01) = |a〉〈b|+ |b〉〈a|+ |c〉〈d|+ |d〉〈c| , (28a)
1
2(ρ00 + ρ01) = |a〉〈a|+ |b〉〈b|+ |c〉〈c|+ |d〉〈d| . (28b)
In general our problem is to extract the eigenvalues of an operator Aˆ given its decomposition
Aˆ = Aij |i〉〈j| (29)
in terms of the states
{|i〉 | i ∈ {a, b, c, d}} (where we adopt the convention of summing over
repeated indices). Explicitly decomposing a vector |u〉 on the same basis as |u〉 = ui|i〉, the
action of Aˆ on |u〉 is
Aˆ|u〉 = Aij |i〉〈j|uk|k〉
= Aijγjku
k|i〉 . (30)
It is not difficult to see that determining the eigenvalues and eigenstates of Aˆ is equivalent to
determining the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix AΓ, where A = (Aij) and Γ = (γij).
(This remains true even in the case where the vectors {|i〉} are not linearly independent.) The
matrix whose eigenvalues we wish to determine may be expressed as D + εΓ, where
D =

γba b
2 γbc γdc
a2 γab γac γad
γda γdb γdc d
2
γca γcb c
2 γcd
 , (31)
Γ =

a2 γab γac γad
γba b
2 γbc γdc
γca γcb c
2 γcd
γda γdb γdc d
2
 , (32)
and a2 = γaa, and so on. Let the eigenvalues of this matrix be {λp} and the corresponding (not
necessarily normalised) eigenvectors be {vp}, such that
(D + εΓ)vp = λpvp . (33)
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In terms of the set of eigenvectors, the operator F00 has the expression
F00 =
∑
λp>0
|vp〉〈vp|
〈vp|vp〉 , (34)
where |vp〉 = vip|i〉, i ∈ {a, b, c, d} and the sum is over the indices p for which λp > 0. Using this
and that the |vp〉 are orthogonal, we obtain a matrix expression for the trace of an arbitrary
operator Aˆ multiplied by F00:
Tr
[
AˆF00
]
=
∑
λp>0
〈vp|Aˆ|vp〉
〈vp|vp〉
=
∑
λp>0
v†pΓAΓvp
v†pΓvp
, (35)
The explicit expressions for Q
(0)
AE and δ
(0) are
Q
(0)
AE =
1
2 −
∑
λp>0
v†pΓDvp
v†pΓvp
, (36)
δ(0) = 12 −
∑
λp>0
v†pΓ2vp
v†pΓvp
. (37)
With Q
(0)
AE and δ
(0) determined, we have an optimised value of I(0)(A : E) for fixed δ(0), and all
that remains is to optimise I(0)(A : E) over ε.
Finally, the generalisation when we consider two bases is straightforward: we will approach the
optimisation of I(A : E) by introducing three weighting parameters ε0, ε1, and ε, instead of
one, optimising the quantity
QAE(ε0, ε1, ε) =
1
2(1 + ε)Q
(0)
AE(ε0) +
1
2(1− ε)Q
(1)
AE(ε1) , (38)
and then optimising I(A : E) over (ε0, ε1, ε).
3.3 Inherent QBER
All that remains now, before being able to optimise (38) over all of Eve’s possible unitary
interactions, is to determine the full set of constraints on the metric γij , since not all metrics will
represent a unitary interaction, and to determine the relationship between the metrics γij and γ
′
ij
in the two bases (which depends only on the angles θ and ∆). This is done in the next subsection.
Before this, we demonstrate that there is a minimum nonzero QBER if α 6= β (in which case
Alice and Bob’s bases cannot be perfectly aligned). This is easily verified by expressing the
QBER Q in terms of a basis {|0′〉, |1′〉} intermediate between {|Ψ00〉, |Ψ01〉} and {|Ψ10〉, |Ψ11〉},
and a basis {|0〉, |1〉} midway between {|φ00〉, |φ01〉} and {|φ10〉, |φ11〉}. Specifically,
|0′〉 = cos(α4 )|Ψ00〉+ sin(α4 )|Ψ01〉 , (39a)
|1′〉 = cos(α4 )|Ψ01〉 − sin(α4 )|Ψ00〉 , (39b)
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and
|0〉 = cos(β4 )|φ00〉+ sin(β4 )|φ01〉 , (40a)
|1〉 = cos(β4 )|φ01〉 − sin(β4 )|φ00〉 . (40b)
Setting
Σz = |0′〉〈0′| − |1′〉〈1′| , (41a)
Σx = |0′〉〈1′|+ |1′〉〈0′| , (41b)
and
σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1| , (42a)
σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0| , (42b)
then with this choice of basis the expression we find for the quantum error is
Q = 12 − 14 cos
(
α
2
)
cos
(β
2
)
Tr
[
Σz(σz ⊗ 1E)
]
−14 sin
(
α
2
)
sin
(β
2
)
Tr
[
Σx(σx ⊗ 1E)
]
. (43)
Clearly, −2 ≤ Tr[Σz(σz ⊗ 1E)] ≤ 2 and −2 ≤ Tr[Σx(σx ⊗ 1E)] ≤ 2, and we find the bound
Q ≥ 12 − 12 max{|cos(∆)|, |cos(θ)|} , (44)
with ∆ and θ defined as in (21) (this bound is also saturated, e.g. if Eve does not interfere with
the channel, in which case Σz,x = σz,x). The corresponding upper bound is
Q ≤ 12 + 12 max{|cos(∆)|, |cos(θ)|} . (45)
3.4 Transformation and constraints
We now determine the full set of constraints on the metric elements γij . First, we impose that
the QBER is fixed at Q. This, combined with 〈Ψ00|Ψ00〉 = 〈Ψ01|Ψ01〉 = 1, imposes
a2 + b2 = 1−Q , (46a)
c2 + d2 = Q , (46b)
and Re[γab] = Re[γcd] = 0, with analogous constraints for the basis b = 1. The components γab,
γac, γbd, and γcd transform between the two bases according to
γ′ab = cos(∆) cos(θ)γab + cos(∆) sin(θ)γac
+ sin(∆) cos(θ)γdb + sin(∆) cos(θ)γdc , (47a)
γ′ac = cos(∆) cos(θ)γac − cos(∆) sin(θ)γab
+ sin(∆) cos(θ)γdc − sin(∆) sin(θ)γdb , (47b)
γ′db = cos(∆) cos(θ)γdb + cos(∆) sin(θ)γdc
− sin(∆) cos(θ)γab − sin(∆) sin(θ)γac , (47c)
γ′dc = cos(∆) cos(θ)γdc − cos(∆) sin(θ)γdb
− sin(∆) cos(θ)γac + sin(∆) sin(θ)γab . (47d)
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For a more compact representation, the transformation matrix from [γab, γac, γdb, γdc]
T to
[γ′ab, γ
′
ac, γ
′
db, γ
′
dc]
T can be expressed as[
cos(∆) sin(∆)
− sin(∆) cos(∆)
]
⊗
[
cos(θ) sin(θ)
− sin(θ) cos(θ)
]
. (48)
(47a) and (47d) together with the constraint Re[γab] = Re[γcd] = 0 imply Re[γac] = Re[γbd] = 0.
For a′ and d′, we find
a′2 = cos(∆)2a2 + sin(∆)2d2 + sin(2∆) Re[γad] , (49a)
d′2 = cos(∆)2d2 + sin(∆)2a2 − sin(2∆) Re[γad] , (49b)
from which we immediately see that a′2 + d′2 = a2 + d2. From (49), and taking the real and
imaginary parts of
γ′ad = −12 sin(2∆)(a2 − d2) + cos(∆)2γad − sin(∆)2γda , (50)
we find
δ′ad = cos(2∆)δad + sin(2∆) Re[γad] , (51a)
Re[γ′ad] = cos(2∆) Re[γad]− sin(2∆)δad , (51b)
Im[γ′ad] = Im[γad] , (51c)
where δad =
a2−d2
2 . Similarly, b
′2 + c′2 = b2 + c2 and
δ′bc = cos(2θ)δbc + sin(2θ) Re[γbc] , (52a)
Re[γ′bc] = cos(2θ) Re[γbc]− sin(2θ)δbc , (52b)
Im[γ′bc] = Im[γbc] , (52c)
with δbc =
b2−c2
2 . Orthogonality of |Ψ00〉 and |Ψ01〉 implies Im[γbc] = Im[γad].
We still require a′2 ≤ 1−Q and d′2 ≤ Q individually, which impose
cos(∆)2a2 + sin(∆)2d2 + sin(2∆) Re[γad] ≤ 1−Q , (53a)
cos(∆)2d2 + sin(∆)2a2 − sin(2∆) Re[γad] ≤ Q . (53b)
Equation (53a) is automatically satisfied, in the sense that there are no new restrictions on a2, d2,
or Re[γad], if Q ≥ 12 − 12 |cos(∆)|. Equation (53b) is automatically satisfied if Q ≤ 12 + 12 |cos(∆)|.
Similarly, we automatically have b′2 ≤ 1 − Q and c′2 ≤ Q as long as 12 − 12 |cos(θ)| ≤ Q ≤
1
2 +
1
2 |cos(θ)|.
Finally, using a′2 + b′2 = a2 + b2 and c′2 + d′2 = c2 + d2, we obtain the constraint
sin(2∆) Re[γad] + sin(2θ) Re[γbc] = sin(∆)
2(a2 − d2) + sin(θ)2(b2 − c2) . (54)
3.5 Optimisation
The plots given in figures 1 and 2 were generated by numerically maximising QAE = QAE(ε0 =
ε1 = ε = 0), defined by equation (38), using MATLAB’s fmincon routine, over all metrics
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γij respecting the constraints derived in the preceding subsection for the reported angles θ
and values of QAB and with ∆ = 0, and calculating the corresponding value of I(A : E). For
simplicity, we performed no systematic optimisation over (ε0, ε1, ε). Optimising over (ε0, ε1, ε) in
a few test cases generally supported our expectation that the minimal keyrate would be obtained
for the maximal value of QAE with a symmetric attack (δ
(0) = δ(1) = 0 and Q
(0)
AE = Q
(1)
AE).
Similarly, investigating test cases generally found that the minimal keyrate, given a common
error bound on the deviation of α and β from 90◦, was obtained by setting both to the worst
case such that α = β = θ and ∆ = 0. As a result, the keyrates given in section 2.2 are an upper
bound on the secure keyrate (which is sufficient to demonstrate a degradation in performance)
which we believe are very likely the optimal keyrates.
The maximum tolerable QBERs reported in figure 3 are those for which Q = QAE for the angles
θ considered, again with ∆ = 0.
In addition to the keyrates reported in section 2.2, we also similarly investigated the case in
which only one basis is used to generate the key, by maximising only Q
(0)
AE. In this case, the
resulting keyrates (not accounting for sifting) are lower than those obtained for the case in
which both bases are used, for the same parameters. This suggests that implementations of
BB84 in which both bases are used to generate the key are likely to be more robust against
implementation errors, as we alluded to in section 2.3.
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